But the sanctions were never simply about limiting weapons and military adventurism; the sanctions were about crippling Hussein's capacity to rule. The objective was to force political change within Iraq without having to commit troops to the cause—either by forcing Saddam to liberalize his government or by causing the downfall of his regime. In that effort, we were hardly successful.

Cuba, without a sponsor nation, is far too weak to constitute a renewed military threat to the United States, but the embargo was never simply about crippling Cuba's ability to either strike the US or export advisors, contributing instability to Africa and Central and South America. The goal of the embargo is and was to create a situation where Castro could not rule effectively—a more liberal, democratic state to our immediate south is always in our best interest even if the military threat has subsided dramatically.

The problem with this goal is that it isn't working. Since the US stopped punishing trading partners for trading with Cuba (1975), the impetus for other nations to join us in the embargo is nil. Along with Cuba's intense desire to court the tourist trade and other nations' willingness to shuffle their own and America's tourists to Cuba, the only trade that Cuba is missing is the legal American trade.

Can America win its objective through the current embargo? If the objective is to rid the world of another dictator, the answer is probably no. Without the support of trading partners in isolating Cuba, the embargo is likely to fail. If that is, indeed, the objective, neither will lifting the sanctions open up the island to liberal reform and democracy.

In August, 2001, this was written in National Review:

Two weeks ago, the New York Times estimated that from 40,000 to 50,000 Americans visited Cuba last year in defiance of U.S. travel and currency restrictions. The infatuation of some of our countrymen with Castro's Cuba added about $2 billion last year to the island's economy.

The situation has likely not improved. And while the hard currency tips and trade that come to the workers in the resort areas certainly does make their lives better, the bulk of that money simply goes to feed Castro's failed economy. For every time one of the Castro-worshippers brings out the “free health care” and “free education”, it must be pointed out that there is nothing free in the cash-poor and broken economy. The money that feeds those social programs is money that would otherwise go to the common citizens—people who live on bare pennies per day.

Of course, even with hard currency, finding staples like meat and eggs is a hardship of its own. Money is useless to people when there is nothing to buy—which is to say that in Cuba, there are neither goods nor money nor decent jobs to go around, but the health care system is free for all.

This is the new version of “but they do get the trains to run on time.” And, ultimately, just as empty.

And Hollywood fawning aside, Castro is a dictator. He is a man who holds his power with a tight grip, who charms the naïve in a relentless PR offensive designed to lull America into lifting sanctions, and who has no compunction against wielding his power to squash political opposition and cut his citizens off from news of the rest of the world.

No serious person disputes that Castro holds his power through illegitimate means or that he abuses his authority as the head of a nation. No serious person disputes that the kind of freedom that we enjoy here in the United States is merely a dream for most Cubans. No serious person believes that Castro is anything other than a blight on the world in the same way that all of the “heroes” of the revolution should be despised and hated.

Faced with the options of a leaky embargo, which will likely fail in its current form, or lifting sanctions, which will help Castro's illegitimate government survive, the question is no longer which path to take. The question has become how to change the paths entirely in hopes of finding a better way to achieve the goals.

The embargo and sanctions should be lifted, but that the path to using them and maintaining them needs a distinct makeover. On two diplomatic fronts, the United States needs to work to tighten and leverage the embargo.

The first front should be to court our allies. While it might not be possible to encourage our trading partners to join the embargo, it should be possible to encourage them to help close the door on American tourists bypassing the travel restrictions. The loss of at least two billion dollars of hard currency would have a dramatic effect on Castro's regime.

The second front should be an aggressive diplomacy with Cuba itself. With the threat of a tightening embargo, Cuba's leadership might find itself in a position to make concessions; and with the idea of loosening the trade sanctions, Cuba's leadership might find itself seeing enormous potential economic gain. The talks, though, must revolve around serious political changes.

Free and fair elections, adherence to human rights guidelines, and free market reforms should all be on the list of demands.

The difficulty is that in strategic terms Cuba has none of the urgency of Iraq, and in the area of human rights, Cuba has none of the obvious importance of Sudan. Aggressive talks with both our allies and with Cuba on the issue of Cuban political reform seem unlikely for the foreseeable future. Between the attention required by the war on terror, the new strategic interest in Africa, and the obstinacy of Castro, the idea of dealing with our island neighbor seems terribly far off.

President Bush has been a vocal proponent of the sanctions, though. While the inclination may be to hold the line on the embargo and travel restrictions while waiting for Castro to die and leave, hopefully, more malleable leadership behind, it would far better serve our long-term interests to push for an earlier settlement of issues. Waiting may leave the United States unable to influence future events in Cuba following Castro's death. A strong line now may leave us far better prepared to help guide Cuba toward freedom once Castro has fallen, even though our situation may not seem at its most advantageous now.

The answer to the Cuban question is to continue the embargo, but to do it in a more intelligent and less patient manner.

Resources:
Cuba Embargo Timeline
Peter Wood's National Review article
The President Bush quote was sourced from this Talon News article.