July 31, 2007
Flying the Coop - Part I of IV
Photo: Hubert Matos (upper right) shortly after his arrest and in more recent years at his Miami residence.
Of course, most individuals with a cursory knowledge of Cuban history are well acquainted with the tale of Huber Matos - his days as a comandante, his eventual disillusionment with the revolution and his subsequent arrest and imprisonment. The details of the escape of Matos' adjutants some 47 years ago however, are much more murky and less known. Thus, I offer Bablusians a bit of insight into a jailbreak that "played out more like a cloak and dagger paperback thriller than true-life intrigue," according to journalist, Gabriel Diaz-Torres. Upon chatting with him this past weekend, I though it might be interesting to dust off one of his older pieces. That said, I'll be offering it in four parts, every morning for the next three days. With that, I offer you: "Flying the Coop" (Part I of IV). Note that same names and/or locations have been changed in a bid to safeguard the anonymity of certain individuals.
Flying the Coop - Part I of IV
Forty-six years ago, Juan Eugenio Villalobos was struggling amid the opening salvos of Fidel Castro’s revolutionary government when a chance encounter with a friend hoping to oust the strong-arm dictator changed the course of his life. An heir to one of Cuba’s largest industrial operations, Villalobos, then a man of 35, was about to be drawn directly into a drama that played out more like a cloak and dagger paperback thriller than true-life intrigue.
Photo: Juan Villalobos.
“I was a man who had never before involved himself in politics” says Juan, now an 81-year-old resident of Miami as he dusts off aging black and white photographs of the shipyards his father, Ramon Villalobos built over the course of 50 years. Until recently, the Cuban government ran the shipyards in a joint operation with the Dutch-owned Curacao Drydock Company, and in 2003, members of the Villalobos family registered the confiscated shipyards with the U.S. State Department’s Helms-Burton unit, intent on rebuilding the family business once the Castro regime falls. Although Villalobos was a self-described “apolitical,” his father’s companies had enjoyed numerous lucrative government contracts over the years. During the final years of the Cuban revolution, the shipyards, located in Havana's Casablanca district, had received a contract to apply armor plating to military trucks. The deal would come back to haunt Astilleros Villalobos and, indeed, the entire Villalobos clan. In April of 1960, the revolutionary government seized onto the possibility that vehicles outfitted at the shipyards might have been used by government forces to “hunt down and kill” rebel soldiers. The fledgling government would use the contracts as a pretext for confiscating the shipyards. Subsequently, a May 1960 issue of Cuba’s Official Gazette listed the “seizure of all equipment, utilities, tools, materials, etc” of Astilleros Villalobos, “known for its docks and factories. . .” Villalobos and his entire family were publicly slandered, put out of work and systematically harassed. One relative had already been sentenced to death over an unrelated issue and thus, Juan had more than enough reason to assist in a plan that would contribute to Fidel’s downfall. Leaning back in his chair, recalling the events of the autumn of 1960, Villalobos remarks that although he never agreed with Matos’ ideology and methods, he appreciated the way in which he would eventually confront Castro with allegations of communist infiltration in the new government. “It wasn’t vengeance that motivated me. It was a desire to do what was right for Cuba.”
On January 8, 1959, Huber Matos, formerly a teacher in Cuba’s Oriente Province, rode into Havana atop a U.S.-built Sherman tank alongside a bearded revolutionary named Fidel Castro. Matos, one of the top commanders in Castro’s rebel army, would later be installed as the military commander of Camaguey Province, but fate would deal him a different card. “I had become wary of where the revolution was headed after the tone of certain articles in the military gazette, Verde Olivo, took a decidedly Marxist turn.” On numerous occasions throughout 1959, Matos warned Castro that the revolution was in danger of being hijacked by communists. “He would blow me off, telling me there was nothing to worry about.” Finally, after repeated dismissals by Castro, Huber Matos announced his resignation in a heartfelt letter to Fidel, in which he explained his desire to avoid becoming an obstacle to the revolution. With words that sounded like those coming from a trusted friend, Matos wrote “I also want you to understand that this decision is irreversible, which is why I’m asking you not as Commander Huber Matos, but rather, like any of your friends from the Sierra – Do you remember? . . . . letting me return to my home as a civilian without my children having to hear in the street that their father was a deserter or traitor.” At that point, Matos had no desire to mount an insurrection against his former boss, although nearly 50 years later, Matos has made clear the fact that he would have eventually led his rabidly loyal troops against Castro. Resigning as Camaguey’s military commander, Matos had decided to take up teaching in his childhood home of Manzanillo.
Within 24 hours, a response came from Havana. “Fidel wrote back to me that he accepted my resignation and was sending Camilo [Cienfuegos] to relieve me.” Matos became alarmed by the somewhat insulting tone of the letter, however, and word quickly spread through the Camaguey military barracks that Cienfuegos’ true mission was the arrest of Huber Matos on charges of counter-revolutionary activities. The commander who had won the unflinching loyalty of his troops knew a bloodbath could ensue if he allowed the rumors to spread unchecked and without a personal response. With this in mind, he ordered his troops to stand-down upon the arrival of Cienfuegos, no matter what.
Part II of IV will appear tomorrow, August 1st.
Posted by at July 31, 2007 11:29 AM
Trackback Pings
TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.babalublog.com/cgi-bin/mt/hut.cgi/5734
Comments
Riveting.
Just like an end-of-season cliffhanger:
"What will happen to Commander Matos?"
"Will Camilo arrest his former comrade?"
Find out on the next episode of: "Flying the Coop."
(Anxiously looking forward to the next installment.
Excellent, as usual.)
Posted by: Marta ![[TypeKey Profile Page]](http://www.babalublog.com/nav-commenters.gif)
at July 31, 2007 01:37 PM
Even if Matos had the best intentions and was totally duped by Castro, he was significantly useful to the latter at a critical time, before Castro had actually seized power. In other words, however unwittingly, he functioned as a useful idiot. It may be harsh to say so, but it's the truth.
Posted by: asombra at July 31, 2007 02:37 PM
asombra,
Very true indeed. One must not forget the allegations of executions at the hands of Matos during his tenure in Camaguey. I have no idea as to the veracity of those allegations however - don't know of Diaz-Torres ever asked him either.
That said, how the hell do you spend a year-and-a-half in the Sierra Maestra mountains with Fidel Castro and not know he's a communist?
-Anatasio
Posted by: CubaWatch at July 31, 2007 03:03 PM
Re: "do you spend a year-and-a-half in the Sierra Maestra mountains with Fidel Castro and not know he's a communist?"
One has to realize that there was a struggle to control the revolution. At first it seemed absurd that the known communists who were often notable for their cowardice, could control anything.
However, with Guevara's and Raul's often bloody purges of rebel ranks, it became clear that with false accusations plus betrayals on the battle field and on the plains the communists steadily gained ground... All through this Fidel Castro kept repeating he was not a communist....
In the Guisa area where the escopeteros of Mojena operated, repeatedly the communist guerrillas of Lorente tried to set up ambushes for the Batista troops in which the non-communists escopeteros would be killed. When after "La Ofensiva" Huber Matos's showed up, Lorente's escopeteros ran to hide in the caves at the source of the Guama River...
For more details see:
http://narrations-of-war-in-cuba.blogspot.com/2006/06/19-day-i-met-huber-matos.html
Posted by: Larry Daley at July 31, 2007 03:53 PM
I find it very hard to feel any sympathy for Matos. I mean, his heart-felt-letter to that hyena, Castro, does not exactly tug at my heart strings. Matos spent all of that time in la Sierra Maestra with Castro and together they executed people, and he expected some sort of sympathy and understanding from that hyena? How can you expect sympathy from a hyena? How many people did Castro personally execute, how many people did Castro personally kill even before the Sierra Maestra days when he was a student gangster at the University of Havana? How about the Moncada Barracks Attack when Castro sent his dupes in and hid while they were slaughtered. I'm sorry, I don't feel sympathy for Matos. He was part of the reason why we are here. He should have told his loyal buddies to put up a resistance to his arrest even if a bloodbath insued. And why was he concerned with a bloodbath when he already had blood on his hands? Something doesn't seem right in all of this..
Posted by: Ray at August 1, 2007 08:59 AM
I have a problem with anybody who, for any reason, was of significant help to Castro in reaching power. Matos is in that category. I'm not his judge, but I can't accept him for what he wants to be taken. Castro deliberately fooled a lot of people; some were naive, others just foolish, but Matos was too close to Castro and his inner circle for too long to be let off that easily.
Posted by: asombra at August 1, 2007 12:12 PM
One can argue that at first glance the executions in the Sierra, were necessary for the survival of the resistance to Batista and those in early 1959 were legal punishment. However, in retrospect it seems clear that while superficially most of these bloody acts were overtly intended to offer counter terror to that of Batista's goons, and thus provide protection to the resistance, in reality many, if not most, of these killings were covert power ploys.
Another, not insignificant motive for these killings, was to bind the executioners to Castro. In addition, participation in executions seems to have been a commonly to achieve promotion within the rebel ranks (hacer meritos revolutionarios).
It is notable that many members of Castro's execution squads deliberately fired aiming to miss, but even this generated additional bonds to Castro. The only sure way to avoid all this was to refuse to execute and to do this openly was very dangerous...
The acceptance of this killer code was very common among most in Cuba at the time of victory. I remember clearly being doubted, criticized, denigrated or even laughed at for not subscribing to this deadly code. "Why weren't you promoted, were educated..." was a remark I heard...
Given all of this it is clear that Matos could not obtain a strong political position without being involved in such. It is sad that such a grave moral compromise was all for naught...
Posted by: Larry Daley at August 2, 2007 05:24 PM
Post a comment
Thanks for signing in, . Now you can comment. (sign out)
(If you haven't left a comment here before, you may need to be approved by the site owner before your comment will appear. Until then, it won't appear on the entry. Thanks for waiting.)
